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ABSTRACT
In recent years, wireless sensor networks have emerged as a cost effective
alternative to traditional wired sensor systems. Compared to wired sensors, wire-
less sensors are relatively small in size, operated on batteries, communicate using
wireless radios, and can last for years of operations. In the meantime, mobile
networks have also gained many momentums. With the popularity of modern
smart phones such as the Apple iPhone, we have witnessed a gold rush of mobile
applications and services. The two emerging networks share many common fea-
tures. Firstly, both networks consist of network nodes equipped with sensors that
monitor the physical environment. Secondly, they both have short-range wireless
communication (e.g., ZigBee, Bluetooth or WiFi). Finally, both network nodes
operate on batteries, which requires power efficient programs in order to extend
the length of operating time.
In this dissertation, we focus on four important problems in wireless sensor
and mobile networks: a) data authentication, b) faulty sensor detection, c) in-
door localization and tracking, and d) prediction. We formulate them as spa-
tial/temporal statistical inference problems and develop efficient centralized and
decentralized solution methods.
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In the problem of data authentication, we aim at providing an energy efficient
means for data authentication using spatial correlations. A centralized method
is proposed and is suitable for a wide range of sensor network applications that
emphasize data integrities, such as traffic monitoring and control. Compared to
three competing methods, it reduces the average data error by up to 60% and
reduces the security overhead by an order of one magnitude.
In the problem of faulty sensor detection, we introduce a new method for
detecting faulty sensor nodes without human or centralized interventions. The
proposed method is based on the principles of probabilistic collective theory. The
method consistently outperforms two competing methods with up to 50% higher
detection accuracy. It is suitable for decentralized sensor networks operated in
remote or harsh environments.
In the problem of indoor localization and tracking, we propose a new method
for simultaneously tracking a target and constructing an indoor logic map using
smart phones. The method is designed based on temporal inference and particle
filtering. Simulation results show the proposed method outperforms an existing
method by approximately 9 times in tracking accuracy and constructs maps of
89% accuracy on average. It can be used for location based services like a restau-
rant finder and for internet map services.
In the problem of prediction, we focus on the area of traffic sensor data pre-
diction and present an analytical method to derive the spatial correlation model.
We show that the analytical method acquires close estimation to the learned cor-
relation model without the need for extensive training sensor deployment.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks consist of small battery-powered sensor nodes that mon-
itor the physical environment and report sensing data via low power and short
range radio. In order to achieve years of operation time without human inter-
vention, computation overhead and data load need to be kept to minimal. Small
wireless sensor devices are also prune to being faulty due to many reasons, such as
sensor aging, battery drain and environmental interference. Wireless communica-
tions are naturally vulnerable to malicious attacks, like packet fabrication, packet
modification and packet replay. When deployed in uncontrolled or hostile envi-
ronments, sensor nodes can be physical compromised and the encryption keys are
exposed to the adversary. The design of a sensor network requires a great amount
of consideration on both efficiency and robustness.
As another emerging network, mobile networks share many common charac-
teristics as wireless sensor networks. Modern smart phones such as the Apple
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iPhone and most Android phones carries an array of sensors, including micro-
phones, GPS sensors, accelerometers and digital compass. These sensors can
be used for ambient fingerprinting[4], where a smart phone tries to classify the
user’s surroundings into several categories (e.g., restaurant, pub, bookstore, etc.),
or traffic monitoring [40], where smart phones’ onboard GPS sensors are used
to predict traffic flow in urban settings. Another similarity between the mobile
network and the wireless sensor network lies on their communication approaches.
Wireless sensor devices usually are equipped with short range radio (e.g., IEEE
802.15.4 or ZigBee), and modern smart phones are also equipped with local com-
munication capabilities (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth). As a result mobile phones can
be used as a media for RF-based localization/tracking [30], which is also a com-
mon technique used in the field of wireless sensor networks. Other similarities
include their power constraints (both devices are battery powered), computation
constraints (when compared to desktop class devices), and correlation between
sensor data. To some extent, mobile networks can be viewed as a more powerful
and mobile version of general wireless sensor networks.
In this dissertation, four important issues in wireless sensor networks and mo-
bile networks are identified and are addressed based on either spatial or temporal
inference. The three fields are 1) energy-efficient data authentication, 2) faulty
sensor detection, 3) indoor tracking and map construction, and 4) traffic sensor
data prediction and sensor placement. Next, we give a brief introduction to each
of the four problems.
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1.1 Energy-efficient data authentication
Many sensor network security protocols have been proposed based on cryptogra-
phy. The sensor readings are treated as independent data and are authenticated
separately. This is inefficient in many sensor network applications since sensor
readings are usually correlated [76, 39]. Several methods based on content anal-
ysis have been proposed to authenticate sensor readings using their correlations.
The protection level is usually low comparing to the cryptography based methods.
In this dissertation, we propose a new correlation model based method Co-
bra (Correlation based recovery and auto-detection) that takes advantage of both
cryptography and content analysis. Cobra is resilient to the following data in-
tegrity attacks: 1) packet fabrication, 2) packet modification, and 3) compromised
node. Compared with traditional cryptography based system, Cobra introduces
much less computation and communication overhead. Compared with other con-
tent analysis methods, it provides higher detection rate and more accurate data
recovery. Like other content analysis methods, Cobra does not aim at providing
absolute accuracy. It offers an energy efficient solution in applications where a
small error is allowed.
1.2 Faulty sensor detection
Common sensor faults include short fault – a single-sample spike in sensor read-
ings, random fault – a longer duration of noisy or random readings, constant fault
– anomalous constant offset readings, drift fault – sensor readings are linear func-
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tions of correct values, and loss of sensitivity – sensor readings’ variances are
reduced often due to the aging of the sensor. The faults may be transient or last
for a longer period of time. They have different characteristics that can be used
in fault detection. For example, drift faults result in the shifts of mean and/or
variance of the sensor readings and losses of sensitivity lead to the reduction of
sensor readings’ variance. To our best knowledge, most existing works assume a
particular fault type and propose detection methods accordingly.
In this dissertation, a general measurement mutual divergence is introduced
for detecting arbitrary types of sensor faults. Mutual divergence does not rely on
a particular fault type. We prove the correctness of mutual divergence and in-
troduce three detection methods in both centralized and distributed manner. We
argue that centralized methods are inferior to distributed methods due to their high
demand of network synchronization, long detection delay and large communica-
tion overhead. In our experiments, we have found that the search space for mutual
divergence has many local optimal and one of our proposed methods, the dis-
tributed collection detection, is more capable of finding global optimal than other
methods. In addition, it reports a sensor’s faulty probability. Such additional in-
formation can be utilized to achieve more functionalities in practical systems. For
example, the replacement of faulty sensors can be scheduled based on the order
of their faulty probabilities.
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1.3 Indoor tracking and map construction
Modern smart phones such as the Apple iPhone or Android powered phones use
a hybrid approach to acquire location [2]. The approach first acquires location
information based on the locations of the nearby cellular towers, then uses nearby
WiFi access points for finer localization, and finally utilizes the build-in GPS sig-
nal receiver (if available) for more accuracy. When a smart phone is used indoors,
GPS signal is usually not available and the approach can produce a localization
error as large as several hundred feet. Another approach is based on the idea of
dead reckoning and has been implemented in digital cameras for geo-tagging in-
door photos [34]. The approach uses last available GPS information, usually as
the location before a user enters a building, and build-in speed and heading sen-
sors to track user’s location. The speed sensor and the heading sensor are usually
implemented with accelerometers and magnetometers, respectively. The quality
of location estimates depends on the quality of the speed/heading estimations, and
the error propagates over the course of tracking.
Another line of localization research focuses on finding logical locations in-
stead of physical locations. Take context aware mobile advertising as an example.
It may be useful to know an user’s environment (e.g., grocery stores, bookstores,
or movie theaters) in order to deliver the most relevant ads. SurroundSense [4] is
an example of such systems. A smart phone’s build-in sensors are used to iden-
tify the ambient fingerprints, including the audio, acceleration and visual finger-
prints. Examples of the audio fingerprint are human voices, background music,
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and background noises (e.g., noise from coffee machines at Starbucks). Accel-
eration fingerprint reveals the subject’s moving pattern. One would expect the
moving patterns at hallways and meeting rooms to be different. Visual fingerprint
includes hue, saturation and lightness patterns. Floor tiles and carpet patterns have
been found as reliable indicators of different fingerprints [4]. Using the combina-
tion of various types of fingerprints, SurroundSense has achieved a classification
accuracy of 87% in a trial of 51 logic locations.
In location based applications, it is also critical to prepare a database of geo-
tagged information, such as points of interests (POI) and maps. Obtaining such
information is often difficult and involve tremendous amount of manual inputs. To
our best knowledge, existing global/national map services do not provide detailed
floorplans and their POI lists are far from sufficient. Figure 1.1(a) is the detailed
floorplan for Arnot mall, Horseheads, NY. Figure 1.1(b) shows the Google map
coverage at the same address. Information provided by Google map is not suf-
ficient for navigation or POI lookup in the mall. In addition, it is difficult to
promptly reflect floorplan or POI changes. For example, if a bookstore moves to
a different place at a strip mall, there is no efficient way to update a national POI
database unless a user reports the error.
This dissertation focus on a heterogenous mobile network consisting of mo-
bile phones and WiFi access points, and propose SMART (Simultaneous Map
Acquisition and Repeated Tracking). SMART is a system based on smart phones
and cloud servers. It comprises three components. Firstly, a particle filtering
based method is proposed to achieve location estimates of a mobile device uti-
6
(a)
(b)
Figure 1.1: (a) The detailed mall map of Arnot mall, Horseheads, NY. (b) Google
map at the same address.
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lizing WiFi signals and motion speed/heading. The method outperforms a dead
reckoning method by approximately 9 times in our experiments. Secondly, an
ambient fingerprinting method is described. It is based on the method of Sur-
roundSense [4]. Finally, the fingerprints and the location estimates are combined
to generate a fingerprint map.
1.4 Traffic sensor data prediction and sensor place-
ment
Measuring and reporting traffic counts in realtime provides a guidance for traffic
light controllers and in-vehicle navigation systems. Traffic statistics are also vital
in analyzing road usage and pavement wearing. In recent years, sensor networks
have been proved to be a low cost, reliable, and non-intrusive alternative to tradi-
tional traffic measuring systems such as inductive loops [17]. Usually, the sensor
nodes are placed every few hundred feets along the roads to acquire the complete
traffic information [15]. In a real street system, such networks require tens of
thousands of deployed sensors, which is neither practical nor cost effective.
To reduce the installation and maintenance cost of the network infrastructure,
we explore the spatial correlation between sensory readings. Figure 1.2 shows the
trace of traffic counts in every 50 cycles at two sensor locations from Green Light
District simulator [71]. It is evident that the data share a strong correlation. Using
a multivariate Gaussian distribution to model the correlation, and selecting the
most informative sensing locations based on variances/covariances, we acquire
8
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Figure 1.2: Trace of vehicle counts at two sensor locations at nearby places.
predictions to the complete information with an acceptable level of error. The
selected sensors are merely a small portion of all points of interest. Figure 1.3
shows a sensor network monitoring 20 locations in a city highway system, whose
measurements are used to predict the traffic at any points with an average error of
30%.
We define and analyze an optimization problem, whose goal is to minimize the
average prediction error. We propose an analytical method as an alternative to ma-
chine learning based methods in acquiring the correlation model. We demonstrate
its accuracy in modelling the correlation using simulation results, and discuss its
applications and advantages compared to machine learning based methods.
9
Figure 1.3: A street system with 20 sensor nodes deployed.
1.5 Our contributions
We introduce a new energy-efficient method to authenticate sensor data. Com-
pared with existing methods, it achieves up to 60% higher detection rate for the
forged data and saves energy consumption by an order of one magnitude. It also
protects sensor networks from aggressive attacks by limiting the maximal damage
on data reliability.
In the problem of faulty sensor detection, we introduce mutual divergence as
a general measurement for sensors’ faulty likelihood. Mutual divergence does not
rely on assumptions of particular fault type and can be used to measure unknown
fault types. We also propose a distributed method utilizing mutual divergence
and it is shown to achieve detection accuracies close to 100% in most test cases,
outperforming competing methods by up to 50%.
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We propose a new system for tracking mobile subject and for constructing
logic maps. The tracking method outperforms an existing tracking method by
9 times. The map construction method constructs logic maps with up to 89%
accurate compared with the ground truth. We propose a system architecture to
implement such a system based on smart phones and cloud servers.
We propose a new analytical method to acquire spatial correlation model in the
area of traffic monitoring. During our simulation, the analytical models are shown
to closely estimate the models learned based on training data. The analytical
method eliminates the need for an extensive sensor deployment for collecting the
training data. We also study three algorithms for sensor deployment and find out
that a simple greedy algorithm outperforms a random-trial based method with
only little space for a local search algorithm to improve.
1.6 Dissertation organization
The dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we summarize related
works and describe theoretical backgrounds, including multivariate Gaussian dis-
tribution, probabilistic collective, and particle filtering. In chapter 3, we focus
on the problem of energy efficient sensor data authentication and in chapter 4 we
discuss solutions for distributed faulty sensor selection. The problem of simulta-
neous tracking and map construction is discussed in chapter 5 and the problem of
road traffic sensor data prediction and sensor placement if discussed in chapter 6.
Finally, we reach our conclusions in chapter 7.
11
Chapter 2
Related Works and Theoretical
Background
2.1 Energy efficient wireless protocols
In battery powered wireless sensor networks and mobile networks, energy con-
servation is usually one of the foremost concerns for algorithm/protocol design.
The problem of reducing communication cost is commonly formulated as data ag-
gregation problems. Data aggregation occurs along the packet transmitting path
where internal nodes summarize the data and thus reduce the amount of trans-
mitted data [48, 49, 74, 19, 33, 53, 10, 19, 50, 24, 11]. Data aggregation can be
classified in two categories, tree based and multi-path based. Tree based meth-
ods assume a spinning tree routing pattern and data aggregation is performed at
intermediate nodes, such as [48, 49, 74]. Tree based methods achieve the highest
12
communication saving but is not robust against communication failure. Multi-
path aggregation methods have been proposed to address the problem [19, 53].
They solve the robustness issue at a cost of higher communication cost. Manjhi
et. al. have proposed a hybrid method [50] that promises to take the good of both
worlds. Chan et. al. address the problem of secure data aggregation [11], where
methods for obtain accurate results in the presence of adversaries are discussed.
Another common formulation for reducing communication cost is sensor se-
lection using correlation models. The solutions are based on either Bayesian the-
ory [20, 28], or Markov random field [68]. Krause et al. also study the prediction
problem using a correlation model based on multivariate Gaussian distribution
[39].
2.2 Data authentication in energy-constrained envi-
ronments
In wireless sensor networks, many data authentication protocols have been pro-
posed based on cryptography. Some commonly known protocols are MiniSec
[46], TinySec [35], and SNEP [57]. These protocols add 3 ∼ 8 extra bytes to the
12 bytes header in the standard TinyOS network stack. For energy consideration
the protocols are designed with short-keys or even shared keys, which are secure
only until 2012. The IEEE 802.15.4 based Zigbee standard provides a higher
level of data security at an expense of significantly higher communication over-
heads [3]. The cryptography-based protocols are shown to be energy consuming.
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In [12], Chang et. al. examine the energy consumption of several commonly used
hashing and symmetric-key encryption schemes on Crossbow and Ember sensor
motes. The tested security schemes consume 18∼134 times more energy in com-
putation and 2∼3.3 times more energy in communication.
Another family of security methods verifies sensor packets by analyzing their
contents. Most proposed methods use correlation models to solve the problem,
including CORA [67], ART [69] and Bayesian Selection [54]. CORA suffers
from very high false alarm rate. ART is not secure if an attacker modifies a large
fraction (> 10%) of the readings or compromises the sender node. Bayesian
Selection deals with compromised nodes but it relies on a strong assumption that
the bias introduced by the attacker is persistent. Otherwise the false alarm rate
can be as high as 50%. Other methods are proposed using the idea of random
sampling [60] or distribution-based deviation detection [56, 52]. Comparing to
the correlation-based methods, they produce less accurate detections and larger
errors on data recovery.
2.3 Faulty sensor detection
Most faulty sensor detection methods are based on correlation analysis between
neighboring sensors’ readings. The correlation models can be represented by joint
distributions [76, 67, 54, 26], by correlation coefficients [61, 69], or by some
arbitrary similarity measures, such as thresholding on sensor reading differences
[14] and event region based clustering [47, 41]. Methods based on data fusion [38]
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and outlier detection [21, 56] have also been proposed. In these works, a particular
type of faults is usually assumed and specialized methods are developed. It is
fairly easy to break a detection method by switching fault types.
2.4 Localization and tracking in wireless sensor and
mobile networks
Radio signal based localization is broadly used. RF Measurement techniques can
be classified into three categories. The first category is angle of arrival [37, 62,
6], where a device make use of its antenna’s receiving signal characteristics to
estimate the direction a message sender is located. The second category is distance
related measurements such as one-way propagation time, round-trip propagation
time, and time-difference-of-arrival [51, 25, 13]. The third category is RSS (radio
signal strength) profiling measurements [5, 58, 42, 65, 64], where RSS is mapped
to a distance measure.
RF based localization can be classified as infrastructure-based RF and infrastructure-
less RF approaches. infrastructure-based RF approach requires special hardware
(beacon) in the environment and a device localizes itself based on the beacon
messages. Cricket [59] and Pinpoint [75] are early examples of this approach.
Recently, Hay et. al. have proposed a method to localize smart phones us-
ing low level non-authorized Bluetooth connections to location beacons [30].
infrastructure-less RF approach does not require additional hardware. Instead it
utilizes signals already available in the environment, such as WiFi or GSM sig-
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nals. It is more cost effective and easy to scale. Chen et. al. have proposed a
method that combines the benefits of GSM and WiFi localization [16]. Active
campus [27] is a localization project on UCSD campus based on pre-known WiFi
hotspots. Bahl et. al. have proposed a localization method based on WiFi fin-
gerprinting that achieves localization accuracy of up to 5 meters [5]. However it
requires throughout fingerprint mapping in advance and is not scalable.
Adding mobility information to RF based methods has shown promising re-
sults in improving localization results. The combined methods usually lay their
grounds on the principals of particle filtering [70] [78] [36] [66] [31]. MCL [31]
utilizes maximal speed information in addition to radio proximity information.
MSL and MSL* have been proposed to improve MCL [66] by utilizing neigh-
boring nodes’ location estimates. MSL and MSL* converge faster and are more
robust against the decrease of location beacon density. Turgut et. al. further im-
prove the technique by automatically restarting the process of particle filtering if
the particle cloud diverges too much from the observations. Particle filtering based
localization have been applied to different scenarios. In [36], a human subject car-
ries a sensing device equipped with accelerometers (used as a pedometer), mag-
netometers and a radio receiver. The mobility information (steps/speed, heading)
and radio proximity information are used in combination with building floorplans
to perform indoor tracking. In [78], moving vehicles are equipped with receivers
that overhear location beacon broadcasted by in-pavement wireless traffic sensors.
The information are combined with road map and odometers for vehicle tracking.
It is worth mentioning that Kalman filter or its variants can be used to solve sim-
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ilar problems. It provides analytical solutions in contrast to the simulation based
solutions in particle filtering. However it is often difficult to derive a Kalman filter
in complex problems especially when the subject’s mobility model is non-linear.
Kusy et. al. have proposed a least-squares optimization based improvement that
achieves almost 50% higher accuracy than regular Kalman filter [43].
Context/environment sensing has also been an active research field [4] [22]
[63] [23] [18]. The goal of seeing, hearing, or feeling logical locations is intrigu-
ing and has motivated many researchers to find the proper set of sensors for their
applications. Cameras have been a popular choice to identifying stable scenes
[22] [63] [18], or floor patterns [4] [23]. Microphone is used in [4] and [18] and
accelerometer is used in [4]. SurroundSense [4] is a system that uses a combina-
tion of cameras, microphone and accelerometers. It has been prototyped on Nokia
N95 phones and properly identifies the fingerprints among 51 logic locations on
or around Duke University campus 87% of the time.
2.5 Traffic sensor data prediction and sensor place-
ment
The problem of using sensory data to guide traffic light controller is well studied.
Wiering et al. investigate different control policies in [71] using the traffic queue
length and vehicles’ waiting time. Chen et al. [15] propose a system that uses
the information exchanged between roadside and in-vehicle sensors. The Green
Light District (GLD) simulator [71] is a free and open source software served as a
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testbed for traffic control policies. We implement a sensor class in this simulator
that provides traffic information for traffic light controllers. The developments of
such systems are made possible by the advance in the field of sensor network.
Cheung et al. develop hardware that utilizes magnetic sensors and low power
radio communications [17], which is now manufactured and distributed by SenSys
Network, Inc.
The problem of sensory data prediction using correlation models has also been
an interesting topic for many years. The solutions are based on either Bayesian
theory [20] or Markov random field [68]. To our best knowledge, Guitton et al.
first introduce the concept of data prediction into the field of traffic measuring in
[29], where he explores the correlation coefficient between traffic counts. We have
shown in our previous study that the correlation coefficient based method is less
accurate in predicting sensor data than a Gaussian based method [76].
2.6 Theoretical Background
2.6.1 Spatial inference model based on multivariate Gaussian
distribution
Let V denote the set of all sensor nodes and let xV denote the random variables
corresponding to the sensor readings. A multivariate Gaussian distribution is used
to model the correlation among sensors in V . It has two parameters, a mean vector
µ = {µ1, µ2, ..., µV }, and a |V | × |V | covariance matrix. The parameters are pre-
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learned using training data collected from a temporary deployment of sensors at
all points of interest. Note that a model is only good for the data that are similar
to the training data. If the environment changes, new model needs to be learned to
account for the difference. We assume that the model used in this dissertation is
learned over an extensive period and can reflect all the conditions (though outliers
may still present).
We refer to this correlation model as the prior distribution. If we take the mean
µi corresponding to sensor i and the entry at the ith row and ith column from the
covariance matrix, we acquire the distribution for sensor i’s reading independent
of other sensors. Let X tQ denote the readings of sensors in set Q (the observed
sensors) at time period t. A posterior distribution for unobserved sensors in U =
V −Q is given by
P (xU |X tQ) =
P (xU , xQ = X
t
Q)
P (xQ = X tQ)
. (2.1)
Equation 2.1 is derived using Bayes’ rule. Given the probability density function
of multivariate Gaussian distribution of
P (xV ) =
1
(2pi)|V |/2|COV |1/2 e
− 1
2
(xV −µV )T COV −1(xV −µV ), (2.2)
we have the mean and covariance matrix of the conditional probability as
µxU |XtQ = µU + COVY QCOV
−1
QQ(X
t
Q − µQ), (2.3)
COVxU |Q = COVUU − COVUQCOV −1QQCOVQU . (2.4)
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Figure 2.1: The prior distribution of the readings at a sensor location, and its
posterior distribution given observations of 20 or 64 other sensors.
COVUQ is acquired by taking the rows in U and the columns in Q from the co-
variance matrix.
Equation. 2.3 can be used to predict U ’s readings, i.e., the predicted value is
the posterior mean. Eq. 2.4 measures the uncertainties of the prediction for each
sensor since COVxi|Q is the posterior variance for sensor i. Note that COVxU |Q
does not depend on the actual readings X tQ. It is used in sensor selection. One
wants to select the set Q so that the average variance in COVxU |Q is minimized.
Figure 2.1 shows a prior distribution for a sensor learned from vehicle counts
collected at 84 sensor locations [76], and two posterior distributions when |Q| =
20 and |Q| = 64 (Q20 ⊂ Q64). Usually adding more observations leads to more
certain posterior distributions. However as shown in [77] the benefit of adding
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more sensors is diminishing as Q grows larger.
It is noted in the literature that in most correlation models nearby sensors carry
stronger correlation [76, 39]. We use this property to reduce the storage space at
each sensor, i.e., a sensor only stores the correlations with its neighbors.
2.6.2 Probabilistic collective theory
To perform spatial inference in a distributed manner, we adopt the theory of Prob-
abilistic Collectives (PC). PC theory is a new framework for distributed decision
making with probabilistic decisions [45, 72, 73]. In the PC theory, the optimiza-
tion objective is casted as minimization of a function of the variable distribu-
tions [45][73]. Powerful distributed optimization methods using second order
methods, difference utilities, annealing, data-aging, and supervised learning have
been developed in the PC framework and have been shown to outperform other
optimization techniques, including genetic algorithms and simulated annealing,
on numerical optimization benchmark problems and classical combinatorial opti-
mization problems, such as k-SAT, n-Queens, and bin packing [9][32]. For small-
scale real applications, the PC approach has been successfully applied to real-time
adaptive control of mini-flaps on trailing edges of airplane wings to minimize tur-
bulence [7][8].
Let fi denote the decision variable for sensor i (e.g., whether the sensor is
faulty). A PC theory based method looks at finding the probability distribution
for fi instead at finding the exact value. Each sensor’s decision variable fi is
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considered independent from each other. We have
P (fV ) =
∏
i
P (fi). (2.5)
The objective is to minimize a goal function G(fV ). Given the probability distri-
bution P (fV ), the expected goal value is given by
E[G] =
∫
dfV P (fV )G(fV ) =
∫
dfV
∏
i∈V
P (fi)G(fV ). (2.6)
In a Nash equilibrium, every sensor adopts a mixed decision to optimize its ex-
pected goal function. However in a distributed system full rationality is absent
due to the lack of information. It is often hard to for a sensor to choose the ex-
act strategy. Shannon entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of a decision
distribution. We have
S(Pi) = −
∫
dfiP (fi)lnP (fi). (2.7)
A PC method is an iterative process. It usually starts with a uniform distribu-
tion. The updating rule in each iteration is given by
Pi(fi = x) = Pi(fi = x)− αPi(fi = x)×
{E[G|fi = x]− E[G]
T
+ S(Pi) + lnPi(fi = x)}, (2.8)
where α is the step size (usually set to 0.2), T is the temperature (usually starting
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with 0.1 and has a cooling rate of 1%), and E[G|fi = x] is the expected goal
value given decision x. Equation 2.8 guarantee that the probabilities always sum
to unity but does not prevent negative values. Negative values are set to a small
constant (1× 10−6) and the probabilities are then renormalized.
In Eq. 2.8, the part E[G|fi = x] − E[G] measures how good a strategy is.
If the expected goal value when x is adopted is smaller (better) than the average
goal value, the probability of fi = x becomes larger for the next iteration. It
helps to focus on the promising solutions but may lead to local optimal. The
part S(Pi) + lnPi(fi = x) compares the probability of fi = x to the average
probability. If x is less likely than average this part gets a negative value and x
will have a better chance being explored in the next iteration. This part helps to
avoid local optimal but may prevent the solution from converging. A temperature
T is used to balance the term. At first a higher temperature is used to avoid local
optimal. As the temperature cools down through iterations, the solution finally
converge to a few promising ones.
To compute the value for E[G|fi = x] and E[G] efficiently, a Monte Carlo
sampling method is used. In each iteration, each sensor draws m samples from
the current distribution P (fV ) and approximate the value of E[G|fi = x] and
E[G] as the average goal values.
A distributed implementation of a PC method requires designing a private goal
function, i.e., the goal function that can be computed based on each sensor’s avail-
able information. Each sensor has a ”neighborhood view” related to its neighbors
and itself only. It updates its own probability distribution based on Eq. 2.8 and the
23
Figure 2.2: A graphic chain model for temporal inference.
private goal function, and then broadcasts its distribution to all neighbors for be-
ing used in the next iteration. Such a framework requires the message exchanges
between neighboring nodes only and is both scalable and efficient.
2.6.3 Temporal inference based on particle filtering
Some sensor data such as a smart phone’s location also carries strong temporal
correlation. A graphic chain model (figure 2.2) is used to represent the transition
over time. t1, t2, t3, t4 represent 4 time periods. Figure 2.3 gives an example of
possible states in each time period and the arrows represent the transition func-
tions.
In mobile target tracking, the states correspond to possible locations and the
transition functions correspond to motion dynamics, such as motion direction and
speed. The solution space for the locations is infinite and is usually represented
by a distribution. The problem can be simplified by reducing the state space to a
finite set of locations (particles), and the temporal inference is performed on the
particles using the transition functions.
In this dissertation, the theory of particle filtering is used for mobile target
tracking. The initial particles are randomly select from all possible locations,
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Figure 2.3: A graphic chain model representing state distributions with state tran-
sitions.
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and are updated iteratively based on measured motion direction and speed (both
subject to random noises). Observations such as RF proximity information are
used to filter out unlikely sample in order to get more precise location distribution
estimates.
26
Chapter 3
Cobra - A New Method for Energy
Efcient Data Authentication
3.1 Problem formulation
In data collection tasks, a sensor network consists of a home server and a number
of sensor nodes. Several access points may be added to connect disconnected
sensor nodes. We assume the communication links between the access points and
the home server are secure.
The time is divided into a number of sampling periods. In each sampling
period, each sensor node transmits its current reading to a home server via multi-
hop communications. A sensor node has a pre-installed unique private key. The
home server has the corresponding public keys necessary to authenticate signature
from each sensor node.
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We assume the stealth attacker model in [60]. A stealth attacker only attacks
the system by trying to convince the home server to accept the malicious readings.
He does not drop a packet (denial-of-service) since it will be noticed by the home
server. We focus on the four specific attacks as follows:
• Packet Fabrication: The adversary forges the readings of legitimate sen-
sor nodes. In each sampling period, the home server may receive multiple
readings claiming the same sender ID.
• Packet Replay: The adversary replays a previously received packet. This
creates an effect on the home server similar to packet fabrication.
• Packet Modication: The adversary intercepts the packet from a legitimate
sensor node, and modifies the content before forwarding it.
• Compromised Node: The adversary physically compromises a legitimate
sensor node and reads the key. He can send forged readings with legitimate
signatures.
In order to to provide reliable data at the home server, a security method must
guarantee high detection rate on malicious readings that are significantly different
from the real readings [60]. To measure the difference between the malicious
readings and the real readings, we introduce a new metric attack aggressiveness.
Let X ti
F denote the malicious reading claiming the ID of sensor i in sampling
period t and let X ti
T denote the real reading. The bias introduced by the malicious
reading is given by
 = X ti
F −X ti T . (3.1)
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The attack aggressiveness is defined as ||.
One performance metric is the detection accuracy given by
Sacc =
∑T
t=1(N
TN
t + N
TP
t )
T × n , (3.2)
where T is the number of sampling periods, n is the number of sensor nodes, N TNt
is the number of detected malicious readings (true negative) in sampling period t,
and NTPt is the number of accepted legitimate readings (true positive) in sampling
period t.
Another performance metric is the average deviation of the accepted readings
from the real readings, given by
∆RMSE =
√∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 (X̂
t
i −X ti )2
T × n , (3.3)
where X ti is the real reading of sensor node i in sampling period t and X̂ ti is the
accepted reading. ∆RMSE is also known as the root mean square error (RMSE).
The third performance metric is the security overhead measured in terms of
the communication overhead and the computation overhead. The communication
overhead is measured using the number of extra transmitted bytes, given by
Ccomm =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
hi × bti, (3.4)
where hi is the hop distance of sensor i to the home server and bti is the extra bytes
introduced by the security protocol in sensor i’s packet during sampling period t.
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The computation overhead is measured using the extra energy cost at the sender
sensor node. For simplicity, we assume that the energy to generate a signature is
fixed and equals to 1 (the assumption is valid according to the results in [12]). The
overall computation overhead is
Ccomp =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
cti, (3.5)
where cti is either 1 (authenticated) or 0 (un-authenticated).
3.2 An overview of Cobra: correlation based data
recovery and auto-detection
In Cobra, only a small fraction of sensor nodes operate in a protected mode (white
mode) in each sampling period. Their packets are protected with digital signatures
and counters (to prevent packet replay). A reading sent from a sensor node in the
white mode is referred to as a white reading. It is only vulnerable to compromised
node attacks. Other sensor nodes operate in an unprotected mode (gray mode) to
save energy. The corresponding readings are referred to as gray readings and are
vulnerable to all four mentioned attacks. Note that Cobra can be easily extended
to offer multiple levels of protection (e.g., different key lengths).
Cobra consists of the following three components:
• Auto-detection: The home server first authenticates the white readings us-
ing a pre-learned correlation model (as described in section 2.6.1) and gen-
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erates a set of trusted readings (proofs). Next it authenticates the gray read-
ings using the proofs and the same correlation model.
• Data recovery: The home server recovers the true values of the detected
malicious readings black readings using the proofs and the correlation model.
• Distributed sensor node scheduling: each sensor node decides whether it
will operate in white or gray mode based on its remaining energy or accord-
ing to a pre-installed schedule.
3.3 Cobra details and analysis
3.3.1 Against packet fabrication/replay
When the home server receives more than one readings with the same sender ID
i, the posterior probability distribution of the corresponding variable xi is derived
using the proofs (Eq. 2.3 and Eq. 2.4). The reading with the highest probability in
the posterior distribution is regarded as the legitimate reading. The other readings
are simply discarded.
Theorem 3.3.1 The expected detection rate of Cobra against packet fabrication/replay
attacks is a monotonically increasing function of the attack aggressiveness and a
monotonically decreasing function of the posterior variance.
Proof: Given the mean µ and variance σ2 in the posterior distribution
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P (xi), a malicious reading is detected if
|XFi − µ| > |XTi − µ|
⇒ (XTi + − µ)2 − (XTi − µ)2 > 0
⇒ (XTi + )2 + µ2 − 2(XTi + )µ− (XTi )2 − µ2 + 2XTi µ > 0
⇒ (XTi )2 + 2 + 2XTi − 2XTi µ− 2µ− (XTi )2 + 2XTi µ > 0
⇒ 2 + 2XTi − 2µ > 0
⇒ (2XTi + − 2µ) > 0 (3.6)
Let Υ denote the solution interval of Eq. 3.6. The detection rate (true negative) is
given by
E(sTN) = P (xi ∈ Υ), (3.7)
where P is the posterior distribution derived from the proof. We have
Υ =
 (
2µ−
2
,∞) ,  > 0
(−∞, 2µ−
2
) ,  < 0
(3.8)
The expected detection rate is given by
E(sTN) =

1
2
[1 + erf( 
σ2
√
2
)] ,  > 0
1
2
[1 + erf( −
σ2
√
2
)] ,  < 0
=
1
2
[1 + erf(
||
σ2
√
2
)],  6= 0. (3.9)
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erf is the error function commonly used in the integration of Gaussian probability
density function. It is a monotonic function and erf(x) ∈ (−1, 1). As a result,
the expected detection rate is monotonically increasing with ||. In addition, the
expected detection rate increases when σ decreases. This usually happens when
more proofs are added.
3.3.2 Against packet modification
The home server derives the posterior distribution for each unique gray reading
using the proofs. A reading is declared a “black reading” and rejected if it does
not fall into a (1− α) confidence interval (α is a constant in interval (0, 1)).
Theorem 3.3.2 The expected detection rate of Cobra against packet modication
attacks is a monotonically increasing function of the attack aggressiveness || and
α, and a monotonically decreasing function of the posterior variance.
Proof: The malicious readings are detected if
XFi < µ− kσ, or XFi > µ + kσ
⇒ XTi +  < µ− kσ, or XTi +  > µ + kσ
⇒ XTi < µ− kσ − , or XTi > µ + kσ − . (3.10)
33
The expected detection rate is given by
E(sTN) = P (xi < µ− kσ − ) + P (xi > µ + kσ − )
= P (xi < µ− kσ − ) + 1− P (xi < µ + kσ − )
= 1 +
1
2
(erf(
−kσ − 
σ
√
2
)− erf(kσ − 
σ
√
2
))
= 1− 1
2
erf(
kσ − 
σ
√
2
)− erf(kσ + 
σ
√
2
). (3.11)
Take partial derivative by σ, , k and we have
∂
∂σ
E(sTN) =
1√
pi
(−σ
−2
√
2
e
−( kσ−
σ
√
2
)2
+
σ−2√
2
e
−( kσ+
σ
√
2
)2
),
∂
∂
E(sTN) =
1√
pi
(
1
σ
√
2
e
−( kσ−
σ
√
2
)2 − 1
σ
√
2
e
−( kσ+
σ
√
2
)2
).
We have
∂
∂σ
E(sTN) < 0 (3.12)
and 
∂
∂
E(sTN) > 0 ,  > 0,
∂
∂
E(sTN) < 0 ,  < 0.
The detection rate increases when the degree of attack || increases, or when σ
decreases. i.e. more proofs are added.
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Figure 3.1: 4 posterior distributions are derived for “A”. If “A” is in the (1 − β)
confidence interval of a posterior distribution, it receives one vote.
3.3.3 Against Compromised Node
For each white reading Xi, the home server uses every other white reading to
derive a number of posterior distributions of xi. In each posterior distribution,
if Xi is in a pre-defined (1 − β) confidence interval, it receives one vote. If a
white reading receives at least a fraction of γ among all votes, it is accepted as a
proof. Otherwise, it is declared as a black reading. Note that to make the process
independent of the order of voting, the black readings can still involve in deriving
posterior distribution for other readings. Figure 3.1 illustrates the voting process.
Theorem 3.3.3 The detection rate of malicious readings sent by a compromised
node in Cobra is a monotonic function of the attack aggressiveness.
Proof: Let l denote the total number of legitimate nodes. Let θ denote
the percentage of legitimate readings voting for a malicious reading. Let y be
the random variable representing the number of legitimate nodes among nodes
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operate in the white mode. P (y) follows a hypergeometric distribution given by
P (y) =
C lyC
n−l
np0−y
Cnnp0
. (3.13)
The expected detection rate is given by
E(STN)
= P ((1− θ)(y) ≥ (1− γ)(np0 − 1))
≈ 1− P (y ≤ (1− γ)np0
1− θ ). (3.14)
From theorem 3.3.2, (1− θ) is a monotonic function of ||. Therefore, E(STN) is
a monotonic function of ||.
The expected true positive rate is given by
E(STP ) ≈ 1− P (y ≤ γnp0
1− β ), (3.15)
and the overall accuracy is given by
E(Sacc) =
l
n
E(STP ) + (1− l
n
)E(STN). (3.16)
Take the partial derivative of Eq. 3.16 with respect to γ and set it to zero, we derive
the value of γ that maximizes the detection accuracy. The solution is relevant to
parameters l and θ that are not easy to estimate in real world applications. An
empirical model is used where l and θ are assumed to follow certain distributions.
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Assume that l and θ us independent, the value of γ in the empirical model is given
by
γ =
∫ ∫
p(l)p(θ)γlθdldθ, (3.17)
where γlθ is the value computed using the analytical process given l, θ and p(l), p(θ)
are the probability distribution functions of l and θ, respectively. In Cobra, l is as-
sumed to follow a uniform distribution in interval [0.1, 0.9] and θ is assumed to
follow a uniform distribution in interval [0.05, 0.4]. The value of γ in the empirical
model is computed as 0.482.
3.3.4 Auto-detection against all four attacks
When the network is subject to all four attacks, the home server first adopts the
voting-based method to select proofs among the white readings. Next the home
server checks against the packet fabrication/replay attack, leaving one unique
reading for each sensor node operating in the gray mode. At last, the gray readings
are checked to detect the packet modification attack. The process is illustrated in
Fig. 3.2
3.3.5 Data Recovery
The real value of the black readings are estimated as the mean of their posterior
distribution derived using the proofs (Eq. 2.3).
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Figure 3.2: The process of auto-detection against all four attacks. Step 1: detect
white readings sent by the compromised nodes. Step 2: detect packet fabrica-
tion/replay attacks. Step 3: detect packet modification attacks.
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3.4 Experimental result
Cobra is evaluated using the 4 weeks’ traffic volumes collected at 100 locations in
Chicago highway system. The data of the first week was used to train the corre-
lation model. Two models were trained using the maximum likelihood estimator,
one for weekdays and one for weekends. The length of a sampling period was 5
minutes. The following parameters of Cobra:
• p0: the percentage of nodes operating in the white mode,
• (1 − α): the confidence interval used in detecting packet modification at-
tacks,
• (1 − β): the confidence interval used in detecting node compromisation
attacks,
were set to various values.
In the first set of experiments, one false reading was inserted for each real read-
ing. The fabricated readings magnified the real readings XT by 1.2 or 1.5 times.
Figure 3.3 shows the detection rate of fabricated readings against p0. Higher ag-
gressiveness results in higher detection rate. When p0 < 0.2, adding more white
readings significantly reduces the posterior variances and increases the detection
rate. When p0 > 0.2, adding more white readings produces only slight improve-
ments.
In the second set of experiments, 50% of the gray readings were randomly
chosen in each sampling period and magnified by 1.2 or 1.5 times. The confi-
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Figure 3.3: The detection rate of fabricated readings v.s. p0.
dence interval (1 − α) is set to 0.95 or 0.8. Figure 3.4 shows the detection rate
of modified readings against p0. Higher detection rate is associated with higher
aggressiveness, higher value of p0, and higher value of α. Similar to the previous
experiments, the detection rate starts to converge after p0 > 0.2. Note that the
detection rate is not always monotonically increasing in respect to p0. This is be-
cause the data have some outliers and the outliers being included in the proofs can
generate inaccurate posterior distributions. This is especially the case when p0 is
larger since it is more likely to have an outlier in the signed data packets.
In the third set of experiment, 20% of the sensor nodes were randomly chosen
as compromised nodes. The readings of the compromised nodes were magnified
by 1.1 ∼ 2 times. p0 is set to 0.1 and the confidence interval (1 − β) is set
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Figure 3.4: The detection rate of modified readings v.s. p0.
to 0.8. The detection rate and the detection accuracy (Eq. 5.1) were measured
among white readings only. Figure 3.5 shows that the detection rate increases
dramatically as the relative attack aggressiveness increases. The true positive rate
is always around 85% regardless of the attack aggressiveness. Since the number
of legitimate nodes are 4 times as many as the compromised nodes, the overall
detection accuracy only slightly increases as the attacks become more aggressive.
In the last set of experiments, Cobra was compared to CORA [67], MiniSec
[46], and Gaussian Estimation [76] (white readings were used to estimate the
values of gray readings). In Cobra, when a node operated in the white mode, it
used MiniSec protocol and 3 extra bytes were added to the packet headers. The
parameters were set as follows: p0 = 0.1, β = 0.2, α = 0.2. 30 networks were
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Figure 3.5: The detection rate and detection accuracy of white readings sent by
compromised nodes v.s. the relative attack aggressiveness ||/XT .
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Figure 3.6: Under compromised node and packet modification attacks, Cobra’s
comparison to three other methods in terms of the RMSE of the accepted data.
simulated with 20% of the nodes randomly chosen as compromised nodes. The
compromised nodes magnified its own readings and the readings it received before
forwarding them. The packet fabrication/replay attacks were not included since
CORA could not handle these attacks. The sensor nodes were placed with their
real world coordinates from the Chicago data set. The communication range of a
sensor node was set to 4 miles since the sensor nodes were mostly far away from
each other.
Figure 3.6 shows that as the attacks become more aggressive, the RMSEs
(the average of 30 simulations) of all methods except Cobra increase linearly.
Cobra provides a very stable performance. Its RMSE converges when the rel-
ative aggressiveness ||/XT is around 0.4. When the attacker is not aggressive
43
CORA MiniSec Gaussian estimation Cobra
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 106
Ex
tra
 b
yt
es
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
0
2.3 × 106
0.23 × 106 0.23 × 106
Figure 3.7: The communication overhead (number of extra transmitted bytes) of
Cobra comparing to three other methods.
(||/XT < 0.4), MiniSec performs the best. This is because the biases introduced
by the attacker are usually smaller than the error introduced by the data recovery.
Figure 3.7 shows the communication overhead of the four methods (CORA’s
overhead is 0 since no cryptography is used). Cobra only costs 10% of MiniSec.
The computation overhead of Cobra is estimated at 10% of MiniSec since in each
sampling period only 10% of the sensor nodes operate in the white mode.
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Chapter 4
A New Distributed Method for
Faulty Sensor Detection
4.1 A new metric - mutual divergence
Using the correlation model described in section 2.6.1, we propose a new metric
divergence to measure how much the readings diverge from prior knowledge. In-
tuitively, if none of the sensors are faulty, all readings should fit neatly into the
prior correlation model. Given two (possibly overlapping) sets of sensors L1, L2,
their jth readings’ divergence is given by
δ(X tL2, X
t
L1) =
∑
i∈L2
(µi|Xt
L1\i
−X ti )2
|L2| • COVi|L1\i
. (4.1)
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The divergence measures how much (on average) the readings of sensor nodes
L2 diverge from their posterior means derived from the readings of the reference
sensor set L1. The divergence value of one sensor’s reading is normalized using
its posterior standard deviation and squared in account for negative biases.
Mutual divergence is used to evaluate how good a selection of F is given the
most current k readings. We have
∆(V, F ) =
∑
t=1,2,...,k
δ(X tV−F , X
t
V−F )−
∑
t=1,2,...,k
δ(Y tF , Y
t
V−F ). (4.2)
The objective is to minimize ∆(V, F ). In other words, the objective is to mini-
mize the divergence among non-faulty sensor nodes V − F and to maximize the
divergence between non-faulty sensor nodes V − F and faulty sensor nodes F .
Note that for generality we do not assume that the faulty sensors’ readings are
uncorrelated. If such an assumption is valid in particular applications [67, 69, 61],
a third term −∑j=1,2,...,k δ(Y tF , Y tF ) can be added.
We have the objective for the problem of faulty sensor detection as
argmin
F
∆(V, F ). (4.3)
Faulty sensors’ readings will be predicted based on Eq. 2.3. Since the expected
root mean square error is fixed regardless of the actual readings (Eq. 2.4), the
faulty sensor detection accuracy reflects the average data reliability of the final
data set. In the following text we prove that mutual divergence is accurate in
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terms of estimating faulty sensor detection accuracy.
4.2 Theoretical analysis
Let i0, i1, i2 denote three correlated sensor nodes with i0 being the only faulty
one. A correlation mode P (i0, i1, i2) is learned before i0 becomes faulty. Let
ti0 , (t = 1, 2, ..., k) denote the biases of i0 in each of the k recent readings caused
by its fault. From Eq. 4.1, we have
δ(X ti0 , X
t
i1,i2
, P (i0, i1, i2))
=
(µi0|Xti1,i2 −X
t
i )
2
Σi0|i1,i2
=
(µi0|Xti1,i2 − (X
t
i0 + 
t
i0))
2
Σi0|i1,i2
(4.4)
Its expected value is given by
E(δ(X ti0 , X
t
i1,i2
, P (i0, i1, i2)))
= E(
(µi0|Xti1,i2 − (X
t
i0
+ ti0))
2
Σi0|i1,i2
)
=
∑
P (X ti0|X ti1,i2) •
(µi0|Xti1,i2 − (X
t
i0 + 
t
i0))
2
Σi0|i1,i2
(4.5)
For simplicity, let µ denote the posterior mean µi0|Xti1,i2 , X denote the true
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reading X ti0 ,  denote the bias 
t
i0
, and σ2 denote Σi0 |i1,i2 . We have
E(δ(X ti0, X
t
i1,i2
, P (i0, i1, i2)))
=
∑
P (X) • (µ− (X + ))
2
σ2
= 1/σ2 • [
∑
P (X) • µ2 −
∑
P (X) • µ(X + ) +∑
P (X)(X + )2]
=
µ2 − 2µ ∑P (X)(X + ) + E(X + )2 + V ar(X + )
σ2
=
µ2 − 2µ2 − 2µ + (µ + )2 + σ2
σ2
=
σ2 + 2
σ2
= 1 +
2
σ2
(4.6)
For given i0, i1, i2, σ2 is fixed and can be viewed as a constant. Now let us
consider the divergence of an arbitrary faulty set L1 and an arbitrary non-faulty
set L2. We have
1
|L2|
∑
i∈L2
E(δ(X ti , X
t
L1
, P (L2, L1)))
=
1
|L2|
∑
i∈L2
P (X ti |X tL1) •
(µi|Y t
L1\i
− (X ti + ti))2
Σi|L1\i
.
=
1
|L2|
∑
i∈L2
(1 +
ti
Σi|L1
). (4.7)
Equation 4.7 leads to the following theorem:
Theorem: The expected divergence of a sensor set L2 in reference to another
set L1 is a monotonically increasing function of the biases in sensor set L2 and a
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monotonically decreasing function of L2’s posterior variance.
The theorem guarantees the correctness of the objective function defined in
Eq. 4.2. Between non-faulty sensor nodes, the expected divergence is 1 ( = 0)
according to Eq. 4.6. Between faulty and non-faulty sensor nodes, the expected
divergence reflects the amount of bias. The sensitivity of the divergence function
can be increased by introducing smaller posterior variance. This can be achieved
by including more reference sensor nodes and/or by selecting more correlated
sensor nodes as references.
4.3 A distributed detection algorithm
Using PC theory, the objective function Eq. 4.3 is rewritten as
argmin
F
∑
P (F )∆(V, F ). (4.8)
The private goal function for a sensor i is defined as
∆(N(i), F (i)), (4.9)
where N(i) is i’s neighboring node and itself, and F (i) is the faulty sensor nodes
among i’s neighbors and itself. Usually nearby sensor nodes are more correlated.
Such a locality feature helps to increase the detection rate even if only the neigh-
boring sensor nodes are used as references.
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The probability updating rule is given by
Pi(fi) = Pi(fi)− α× Pi(fi)×
{(E(∆(N(i), F (i))|fi)− E(∆(N(i), F (i))))/T +
S(Pi) + lnPi(fi)}, (4.10)
Figure 4.1 describes the details of the distributed collective detection algo-
rithm.
At the end of the algorithm, if a sensor node’s faulty probability is higher than
a certain threshold, it is regarded as faulty. Decreasing this threshold increase
detection rate (true negative) but also produces more false alarms. In our experi-
ments we have found that 0.95 is a sufficiently high threshold. Note that even if a
sensor node is marked as faulty, it still participates in the future decision making
process. This gives the sensor node a chance to recover if the faults disappear.
4.4 Experimental result
For comparison purpose, two base-line algorithms are implemented in both cen-
tralized and distributed manners.
4.4.1 A centralized detection method
In the centralized detection method, the base-station handles the detection process.
In each decision cycle, the base-station makes decision about the faulty sensors
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Distributed collective detection
(decision 1: non-faulty, 0: faulty)
for each sensor i
//set initial decision as a uniform distribution
pi(0)← 0.5;
pi(1)← 0.5;
end
loop
for each sensor i
pN(i)\i ← neighbors′ faulty probabilities;
s← n samples from pN(i);
E[∆]← 0;
E[∆|0]← 0;
E[∆|1]← 0;
h← 0; //number of samples where i is faulty
for each sample r
gr ← ∆(N(i), F(i)); //Eq. 4.2
E[∆]← E[∆] + gr;
if(fi = 1)
E[∆|1]← E[∆|1] + gr;
h + +;
else
E[∆|0]← E[∆|0] + gr;
end
end
E[∆]← E[∆]/n ;
E[∆|1]← E[∆|1]/h ;
E[∆|0]← E[∆|0]/(n− h) ;
update pi(0), pi(1) based on E[∆], E[∆|1], E[∆|0]; //Eq. 4.10
inform neighbors about the updated pi(0), pi(1);
end
terminate after a certain number of iterations;
end
Figure 4.1: Algorithm of distributed collective detection algorithm.
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solely based on the k most recent readings received from each sensor node. In
this paper, we implemented a simple random sampling method for comparison
purpose. A based-station randomly draws m samples. In each sample a sensor
is either faulty or non-faulty. The base-station computes the mutual divergence
value (Eq. 4.2) for each sample and chooses the sample with the minimal mutual
divergence.
4.4.2 Distributed simultaneous detection with pure decision
A sensor node receives broadcasts from its neighbors consisting their most re-
cent k readings. It also receives the current decision (faulty/non-faulty) of each
neighboring sensor node. A sensor node decides that it is either faulty or non-
faulty based on which one yields smaller mutual divergence in the neighborhood
(Eq. 4.9).
The iterative detection method starts with a random assignment of each sensor
node being faulty or non-faulty. In each iteration, if a sensor node has changed its
decision in the last iteration, it broadcasts the new decision to the neighbors. After
a sensor node receives updated decision from one of the neighbors, it recomputes
its mutual divergence and may choose to change its decision accordingly. The
search process terminates if no more change is made.
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Figure 4.2: 30 sensors deployed in a 6 × 3 field. The sensors’ communication
radius are 2 and the links represent the communication links.
4.4.3 Comparison result
We have conducted three sets of experiments in MATLAB to evaluate the three
detection methods. 30 sensors are randomly deployed in a 6×3 field. An example
of such sensor network is shown in figure 4.2. The background data was simu-
lated as temperature influenced by a 6 randomly placed heat sources. A random
Gaussian noise is added to all data. The mean of the noises was set to zero and
the standard deviation was set to 10% of the real readings’ standard deviation. A
set of data was used to train the joint distribution and another set of similar data is
used for testing. Note that the noises were presented in both the training set and
the test set. Therefore the trained correlation model already reflects the noises.
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The communication radius of a sensor was set to 2. In the distributed detection
methods, a sensor node makes decision based on readings received from neigh-
bors within the communication radius. In the distributed collective method, the
initial decision distribution of each sensor is set to a uniform distribution. In each
iteration, 25 samples are drawn at each sensor to evaluate the distribution.
In the centralized random sampling method, 300 samples are randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution and the one with the smallest mutual divergence value
is used as the detection result.
In the first set of experiments, we test the three proposed detection methods
with the random fault type. A fraction of the sensor nodes are randomly selected
as faulty sensors. We vary the number of faulty sensors from 1 to 9. The broad-
casted reading of each faulty sensor is replaced by a random number indepen-
dently drawn from a uniform distribution in region (0, 300). Such a fault model is
selected since it yields uncorrelated data in the same magnitude as the real read-
ings.
Figure 4.3(a) shows the mutual divergence achieved by different methods.
Out of the three proposed methods, the distributed collective method achieves the
smallest value, followed by the centralized random sampling method and then the
distributed simultaneous method. The distributed simultaneous method performs
poorly since the search space is filled with local optimal. The random sampling
can usually find better results. In addition, the mutual divergence found by the
distributed simultaneous is unpredictable at best. The method may fall into dif-
ferent local optimal given different random starting points. The algorithm of the
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Figure 4.3: (a) Mutual divergence achieved by three proposed detection methods
when random faults present. (b) The detection accuracy of the three methods
when random faults present.
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centralized random sampling suffers from the same problem.
Figure 4.3(b) show the detection accuracy computed as
accuracy =
true positive + true negative
all
. (4.11)
The distributed collective method achieves a constant detection accuracy of 100%,
outperforming the other two methods in all test cases. As the number of faulty
sensor nodes increases, the problem becomes harder. Yet the distributed collec-
tive method is still able to find the true faulty sensor set even when 30% of the
sensors are faulty. Note that when the number of faulty sensors is 7, the central-
ized random sampling method achieves higher detection accuracy than the dis-
tributed simultaneous method despite have higher mutual divergence value. This
is because mutual divergence does not directly measure the number of faulty sen-
sors. It instead measures how much the faults diverge from the real value. It is
not uncommon that a faulty sensor exhibits larger divergence than the average
divergence of several other faulty sensors.
In the second set of experiments, we test the detection methods with drift fault
type. 1 ∼ 9 sensor nodes are randomly picked as faulty sensors and their readings
X are altered by a linear function f(X) = aX + b. We set a to 1.5 and b to
-40. Such a fault model is selected to post probably the hardest challenge for the
detection methods – the faulty sensors are correlated. This is likely to happen in
the case of malicious attacks where the attacker somehow acquires the network
correlation model and introduces correlated faults to avoid detection.
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Figure 4.4: (a) Mutual divergence achieved by three proposed detection methods
when drift faults present. (b) The detection accuracy of the three methods when
drift faults present.
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Figure 4.4(a) and figure 4.4(b) show the mutual divergence and detection accu-
racy achieved by the three methods. Despite facing a more challenging problem,
the distributed collective method still achieves very high detection accuracy. It
only misses one faulty sensor node when as many as 30% sensors are faulty. In
that case, the faulty sensor node is surrounded by other faulty sensor nodes whose
readings can actually validate the its faulty readings. To improve detection rate
in such cases one may have to increase the neighborhood size, either by increas-
ing communication radius or by including 2-hop neighbors. Note that this also
considerably increases the communication and computation overhead. In practi-
cal system it is unlikely that 30% sensor nodes becomes faulty simultaneously. A
faulty sensor node can be detected as soon as it becomes faulty and the percentage
of active faulty sensor node can be limited to a small number.
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Chapter 5
SMART - A New System for
Simultaneous Indoor Localization
and Map Construction
5.1 Problem formulation
A logical map is represented by a W × H matrix where each entry represents a
square patch of unit width/height. Each patch is labelled with a logical location
fingerprint (e.g., restaurant, pub, bookstore, etc.). Figure 5.1 illustrates a logical
map with 5 different fingerprints. Each of the four shaded rectangles represents
a distinct logical location (a shop) and the white area represents the hallway. k
WiFi access points are placed at either random locations or pre-selected points.
Note that in reality WiFi access points are usually placed in a systematic manner
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Figure 5.1: A sample field with 5 logical locations: 4 shaded areas as 4 stores
and white region is the hallway. 12 access points are placed as a grid with their
communication range shown by the circles.
to maximize coverage. A mobile subject moves at random speed and random
directions. Let r denote the maximal communication range of an access point. For
simplicity, we assume a mobile subject can hear the access point if their distance
is shorter than r. In figure 5.1, access points are represented by small dots and
their range are marked with the large circles.
For simplicity, time is also divided into unity length time steps.
There are m mobile subjects carrying smart phones and randomly walking
within the field. The motion dynamics are given by
• Speed: the distance a subject moves in one time step is uniformly distributed
in an interval (vmin, vmax);
• Heading: each subject starts with a random heading and randomly chooses
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a turning angle from a uniformly distribution in an interval (−ρ, ρ). For
simplicity we assume a subject maintain its heading in one time step.
A mobile subject has the ability to estimate its initial location, speed and head-
ing, with random Gaussian noise. On a smart phone, these are likely to be acquired
by assisted GPS [44], accelerometers [55] and magnetometers, respectively. We
also assume a mobile subject can identify the fingerprint of the patch containing
its current location using methods such as SurroundSense [4].
Let M ′ denote the estimated logical map (a W ×H matrix) and let M denote
the ground truth. Our goal is to minimize the difference between M and M ′. The
estimation accuracy is defined as the percentage of correctly estimated patches,
given by ∑W
x=1
∑H
y=1 1|M(x,y)=M ′(x,y)
W ×H , (5.1)
where 1|L = 1 if L is true, and equals to 0 otherwise.
5.2 System overview
SMART consists of three components, localization, ambient fingerprinting, and
map construction. Figure 5.2 shows the system architecture.
Localization: sensor inputs are feed into the localization component to gen-
erate location estimates. First, raw inputs are converted to meaningful measure-
ments, such as from 3-axis acceleration to speed and from magnetometer readings
to motion directions. Next, speed, heading and WiFi proximity information are
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Figure 5.2: SMART architecture: fingerprint extraction and localization are per-
formed on a mobile device. Fingerprint matching and map construction are con-
ducted on servers.
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combined in a particle filter to generate location estimates. The above procedure
is fully implemented on the mobile device without the need of service side com-
puting.
Ambient fingerprinting: it includes two sub-components. First, fingerprint
features are extracted from sensor raw inputs on mobile devices. The features
are transmitted to a fingerprinting server to match with entries from a fingerprint
database.
Map construction: it takes inputs from both the localization component and
the fingerprinting component. It also combines the inputs from multiple users to
generate a new logical location map. During map construction, an incremental
update approach is adopted, i.e., a new map will be integrated into the existing
map rather than replaces the existing map.
5.3 Simultaneous localization and map construction
5.3.1 Particle filtering based localization
The basic idea of particle filtering is to draw N samples around an initial estimate,
and update each sample according to the motion dynamics (e.g., the measured
speed and heading). A sample is commonly referred to as a particle. Observations
(e.g., WiFi proximity information) are used to filter out unlikely particles and
likely particles are usually duplicated several times through a resampling process.
The particles represent the location distribution and their centroid can be used as
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a point estimate.
Initialization: we assume that each subject holds an initial location estimate.
It is acquired as the last available GPS reading before the subject enters the field.
A random Gaussian error is added to the estimate to represent the error of the
GPS reading. N initial samples (x0i , y
0
i ), i = 1, 2, ..., N (x, y are coordinates)are
drawn from a Gaussian distribution whose mean is the initial location estimate
and whose variance is the variance of the Gaussian error. A weight w0i is assigned
to each sample. For simplicity, we assume all sample carries equal weights, i.e.,
w0i =
1
N
.
Update the samples: let v denote the measured motion speed and δ denote
the measured motion direction. v and δ are subject to random zero-mean Gaussian
errors whose variances are σ2v and σ2δ , respectively. A sample (x
t
i, y
t
i) at time step
t is updated as
xt+1i = x
t
i + (v + v)× cos(δ + δ), (5.2)
yt+1i = y
t
i + (v + v)× sin(δ + δ), (5.3)
where v and δ are artificial measurement variances drawn from Gaussian dis-
tribution N(0, σ2v) and N(0, σ2δ ), respectively. The purpose of adding these two
variances are two-fold. First, it accounts for the measurement errors. Second, it
significantly reduces the probability of updating two samples to the same location.
Update the sample weights: the sample weights are updated according to the
following rules
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• If a sample falls outside the boundary, its weight is set to 0;
• Compare the access point proximity of a sample to the measured access
point proximity. If they do not match, set the sample weight to 0. The
proximity of the sample is estimated according to the access point locations
and their communication range;
• For all other conditions, maintain the sample weight at the last time step.
In other words, the sample weight update is to filter out unlikely samples and keep
the likely ones.
Resample: N samples are selected from the samples from the last time step
based on their updated weights. Samples with zero weights are guaranteed to be
left behind and other samples may be duplicated. In cases where all samples have
zero weights, N new samples are uniformly drawn from the region covered by all
heard access points, or from the region with no WiFi coverage if the subject does
not hear any access point.
Figure 5.3 describes the detailed algorithm.
5.3.2 Ambient fingerprinting
Azizyan et. al. have introduced a ambient fingerprinting system SurroundSense
[4]. The fingerprints include acceleration, audio and visual fingerprints. Figure 5.4
shows an iPhone application we used to collect sensor data, and the accelerometer
readings at a hallway, a Starbucks, and a local Bestbuy’s laptop section. The
difference can be easily identified. Two states stay and motion are defined
Localize(x0, y0)
//x0 = (x01, x02, ..., x0N ), y
0 = (y01, y
0
2, ..., y
0
N)
for t← 1, 2, ..., T
v ← measured speed; δ ← measured heading;
for i← 1, 2, ..., N
v′ ← v + v; δ′ ← δ + δ;
xti ← xt−1i + v′ × cos(δ′);
yti ← yt−1i + v′ × sin(δ′);
if (xi, yi) contradict to observations
wi ← 0;
else
wi ← 1N ;
end
end
(xt, yt)← resample(xt, yt, N);
end
Figure 5.3: Algorithm of particle filtering based localization.
based on the variations of readings (over a window size of 8). The acceleration
fingerprints are defined as the percentage of stay, the percentage of motion,
and the number of state switches. Audio fingerprint is based on the amplitude
frequency and visual fingerprint is based on the hue, saturation and lightness of
the scene. Readers are encouraged to read [4] for additional details about ambient
fingerprinting.
5.3.3 Construct probability map
Derive a probability map based on the particles: given N location particles
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xN , yN), a Gaussian kernel is used to derive the location dis-
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Figure 5.4: (a) An iPhone application that collects accelerometer, magnetometer,
and microphone readings. (b) Accelerometer readings collected when the test
subject was walking at a hallway. (c) Accelerometer readings collected when
the test subject was using the cell phone at a coffee table at a Starbucks. (d)
Accelerometer readings collected when the test subject was shopping at a local
Bestbuy’s laptop section.
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tribution. The probability function f̂(x, y) of a point (x, y) is given by
f̂(x, y) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K(xi − x, yi − y, h), (5.4)
where
K(xi − x, yi − y, h) = 1√
2pi
exp(−(xi − x)
2 + (yi − y)2
2h2
), (5.5)
and h is the bandwidth of the kernel. Figure 5.5 shows an example of location
distribution when h = 20.
Let j denote the fingerprint sensed by a subject i’s mobile phone. Its proba-
bility map f ji is set to the values of f̂ .
Update the probability map: for each f ji , update the probability map of
fingerprint j as
M j = M j + α× f ji , (5.6)
where α is the step size. After all signatures have been updated, the probabilities
are re-normalized. Next, each patch in the map is assigned with the most likely
fingerprint. The resulting map is the fingerprint map M ′. Note that if two or more
fingerprints have the same probability at a patch, we set a tie breaker to always
prefer the hallway’s fingerprint, or randomly pick a fingerprint if the hallway is
not among the candidates.
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Figure 5.5: The location distribution derived from the location particles.
5.4 Experimental result
The simulations were conducted using MATLAB with test fields similar to Fig-
ure 5.1. The test parameters are listed in Figure 5.6. We ran each set of experi-
ments for 30 random trials and presented the average results.
We first evaluated the localization accuracy over trials of 1000 time steps. For
comparison purposes, we implemented a dead reckoning method where each sub-
ject used measured speed and heading, and its initial location estimate to track
its physical location. The measurement errors were the same as those listed in
Figure 5.6. The localization error, was defined as the distance from the estimated
location to the true location. In the particle filtering based method, the centroid
of all particles was used as the location estimate. Two access point placements
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parameter name value
width (W ) 100
height (H) 60
number of access points 12
number of subjects (m) 6
number of fingerprints 5
minimal moving speed (vmin) 0
maximal moving speed (vmax) 3
turning angle ((−ρ, ρ)) (−0.25pi, 0.25pi)
initial location est. err. std. 1
speed est. err. std. 0.05
turning angle est. err. std. 0.05
number of particles (N ) 50
kernel bandwidth (h) 20
probability update step size (α) 0.5
Figure 5.6: Simulation parameters.
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Figure 5.7: Location estimation error of dead reckoning, and particle filtering with
different access point placements.
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were tested, grid placement, where all access points were placed at manually se-
lected grid points (e.g., figure 5.1), and random placement, where access points
were placed randomly. In the trials of random placements, we have noticed that
it was not uncommon that two access points were placed very close (distance less
than 20% of the communication range) and complete WiFi coverage was diffi-
cult to achieve. In reality, the scenario of manually selected placement is usually
preferred in order to maximize coverage and access point usage.
Figure 5.7 plots the location estimation error. Dead reckoning method pre-
formed poorly and the errors propagated over the course of tracking. After 1000
time steps, the average error became stable since it reached the maximal average
error bounded by the field. The particle filtering based method with random ac-
cess point placement came in second, with a stable performance but larger errors
in early time steps. This is because the first particle cloud was created around
a flawed initial measurement. The variance of all particles was larger than the
variance of the initial measurements. This can be proved by the theorem that the
variance of two Gaussian random variables summed together is larger than the
variance of each variable. The particle filtering based method with grid access
point placement demonstrated consistently lower error than both methods. This
is because the fields were fully covered by WiFi signals and the particle cloud
always found observations to refine its range.
Next, we evaluated the results of logical map construction. Figure 5.8(a)
shows a logical map and figure 5.8(b)∼5.8(e) are the estimation results after the
1st, 10th, 50th, and 2000th time steps. After the first time step, in addition to iden-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 5.8: (a) The fingerprint map (ground truth). (b) The estimated fingerprint
map after the first time step. (c) The estimated fingerprint map after time step 10.
(d) The estimated fingerprint map after time step 50. (e) The estimated fingerprint
map after time step 2000.
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of estimation errors for kernel based method and access
point based method.
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Figure 5.10: When fingerprint sensing carries 20% error, the percentage of esti-
mation errors for kernel based method.
tifying a portion of the hallway, the kernel based method was able to find regions
containing 3 out of 4 shops. The last shop was not identified because no mobile
subject had visited it. It remained undiscovered until the 50th time step. After-
wards the fingerprint map continued to improve but with diminishing returns. In
fact after about 1500 time steps the results tended to be stable and was less than
12% different than the ground truth.
We compared the kernel based method to a WiFi access point based method,
where the fingerprints at each access point was registered and within its coverage
we assumed the same fingerprint. If one patch was covered by multiple access
points, a fingerprint was randomly chosen with equal probabilities. The access
points were placed in a grid manner for both the kernel based method and the
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Figure 5.11: At time step 500, the floor plans are changed. This is the percentage
of estimation error before and after the changes.
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Figure 5.12: Percentage of estimation errors when there are 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10
mobile subjects.
error of kernel method after error of access point
# of shops 2000 time steps (v1) method (v2) v2/v1
4 10.8% 34.2% 3.2
7 16.8% 50% 3.0
10 22.2% 61.2% 2.8
Figure 5.13: Fingerprint map estimation errors when there are 4, 7, and 10 shops.
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access point based method. Figure 5.9 plots the comparison results. The access
point based method resulted in 34.2% error on average whereas the kernel based
method achieved an average error as low as 10.8%.
The kernel based method is also robust against sensing errors. We set 20%
of the fingerprint readings to be faulty, and re-ran the experiments with the same
setups. Figure 5.10 plots the estimation errors, which is almost identical to the
experiments without sensing errors. During the 20% time when fingerprint read-
ings were faulty, the faulty readings had equal probability to be one of the 4 other
fingerprints (5% each). Therefore, the correct fingerprint (80% chance) still dom-
inated the sensing results and its influence significantly outweighted those of the
faulty readings. To prove this, we have pushed the error rate to 50% and the
performance penalty remained minimal.
In reality, the floorplans may change over time. In the next set of experiments,
the floorplans were changed at time step 500 without alerting the kernel based
method. Figure 5.11 plots the average estimation error of 30 runs. The kernel
based method automatically detected the change and makes adjustments to the
fingerprint map. After 2000 time steps, the average estimation error converged
around 12%.
To understand how the number of mobile subjects affects the estimation accu-
racy, we varied the number of subjects (m = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). Figure 5.12 plots
the average estimation errors. As we expected, less subjects led to slower conver-
gence. When there were only 1 mobile subject, the result did not converge until
the 5000th time step. However, regardless of the subject numbers, when the curves
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did converge, the average estimation errors were always around 11%∼12%. This
leads to the conclusion that as long as the field is fully discovered by the subject(s),
the system should reach a stable and accurate fingerprint map.
We also challenged the kernel based method by introducing more fingerprints.
Figure 5.13 lists the estimation errors of the kernel based method and the access
point based methods when 4, 7 and 10 shops are presented (5, 8 and 11 total
fingerprints, respectively). As the problem became more difficult, the estimation
error of the kernel method increased almost linearly. When there were 10 shops,
the average estimation error converged around 22.2%, which was still 2.8 times
lower than the average error of the access point based method.
5.5 Discussion
The logical map may be further fine-tuned to suit the needs of applications. For
example, the center of an estimated region can be used as a point estimate for
POI lookup services. Alternatively, each region can also be fit into a bounding
box or a polygon for display purposes. We also envision the development of
automatic map matching, where a precise floorplan is matched to a particular
region of local/national fingerprint map. This is useful if the owner of a building
wants to represent his/her properties in more details.
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Chapter 6
A New Method for Sensor Data
Prediction
6.1 Problem formulation
In chapter 3 and chapter 4, the correlation models are pre-learned using machine
learning based methods. In this chapter, we focus on the application of urban
traffic measuring based on the sensor network system manufactured by SenSys
Network, Inc. [1]. A traffic monitoring sensor network consists of three compo-
nents, sensor nodes, access points, and relay nodes. Sensor nodes are equipped
with magnetometers and low-power radio modules. When mounted to the pave-
ment, it counts the number of vehicles passing by. The traffic counts are collected
at access points via multi-hop communications and then sent to the traffic control
system. Relay nodes are added between access points and disconnected sensor
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nodes. We present an analytical method for acquiring the correlation model as
an alternative to machine learning based methods described in chapter 2.6. The
analytical method is based on origin-destination matrix commonly used in traffic
flow analysis.
A directed graph
−→
G = (A,
−→
E ) is used to represent the road map, where ver-
tices in A stand for intersections or entrances/exits, and an edge e = (−−−→u1, u2) in−→E
stands for the directional road segment from intersection u1 to u2. For simplicity,
we only consider the total traffic count of all lanes.
Among all vertices in A, let As denote the set of traffic sources and Ad denote
the set of traffic destinations. Vehicles enter the road system
−→
G through sources
and leave through destinations. An example is the entrances/exits of a metropoli-
tan highway system like Fig. 6.1.
We divide the time into N sampling periods, and each period consists of T
equal-length cycles. A typical daily traffic report has N = 24× 60, T = 60, and
a cycle length of 1 second.
Let I(e) denote all points of interest at road segment e. Let V =
⋃
e∈−→E I(e)
denote the collection of all such points.
Let Q ⊆ V denote the set of points where we deploy sensor nodes and U =
V −Q denote the points where we do not. We also refer to Q as measured points
and U as unmeasured points. The values at points i ∈ U are acquired through
prediction. The prediction error is defined as the average root mean square (RMS)
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Figure 6.1: A street system with 20 sensor nodes deployed.
error of all N predictions. We have
∆(Q) =
∑
i∈U
√∑
t=1...N (x
t
i|Xt
Q
−Xti )2
N
|U | , (6.1)
where X ti is the measured value at point i in sampling period t, and x
t
i|Xt
Q
is
the predicted value at point i given the measured values at all locations in Q in
sampling period t. Our objective is to minimize ∆(Q) with a cost η, formally
written as
argmin
Q
∆(Q), s.t. |Q| = η. (6.2)
81
6.2 Prediction using machine learning based method
The general procedure of constructing a prediction-enabled traffic measuring sys-
tem is as follows. First, a set of temporary sensors are deployed at all points in
V . During the phase of initialization, a central data server collects training data
and train the correlation model. Next, the measured points O are chosen and get
long-term deployment. The network starts to fully function. As the data server
acquires readings from the measured points, it performs prediction using the cor-
relation model and the observations (Eq. 2.3 and Eq. 2.4).
When the environment changes, such as with a road closing or a new road
opening, the correlation model needs to be updated. The updating procedure is the
same as the construction procedure, which involves a costly initialization phase
with a complete temporary sensor placement.
6.3 An analytical method for traffic prediction
Correlation models acquired through machine learning based methods only work
well for the same environment in which they are learned. When the environment
changes, the pre-learned correlation model needs to be updated. It is not feasible
to initiate the learning procedure whenever a change happens. In this section, we
derive a theoretical traffic model that serves as a more cost effective alternative.
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6.3.1 Traffic model
Recall that we have defined the set of traffic sources As and traffic destinations
Ad. Let θ−→l,k denote the percentage of vehicles originated at source l and ended at
k. It is referred to as the destination frequency and is acquired through previous
machine learning or other sources of knowledge. Assume the majority of vehicles
travel from l to k follow the shortest path. The traffic counts at any points on
edge e are the summation of all traffics travelling through e. Given the random
variables of all traffic sources Zl, l ∈ As, the random variable representing a point
at edge e is formally written as
∀x ∈ I(e), x =
∑
l∈As
(
∑
k∈Ad(l,e)
θ−→
l,k
) • Zl, (6.3)
where I(e) is previously defined as the points of interest at edge e, and Ad(l, e)
is a subset of Ad representing the destinations whose shortest pathes from source
l contain e. The distribution of Zl is also acquired through prior knowledge. x
follows a Gaussian distribution since the distributions of all Zl are also Gaussian.
Assuming all sources are mutually exclusive, we have the expected value as
E(x) =
∑
l∈As
λ(x, l) • E(Zl) (6.4)
where
∀x ∈ I(e), λ(x, l) =
∑
k∈Ad(l,e)
θ−→
l,k
. (6.5)
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To understand it better, readers may consider λ(x, l) as the percentage of ve-
hicles that are originated at source l and travel through point x.
We also derive the covariance as
Cov(x, y) =
∑
l∈As
λ(x, l)λ(y, l) • V ar(Zl). (6.6)
The sample mean vector µ is estimated using E(V ), and the sample covariance
matrix COV is filled using Cov(V, V ).
6.3.2 Model Refinement
Through experiments, we verified that this model is accurate in estimating the
sample mean. However, its estimation on the covariance matrix carries large er-
rors, since it omits two important factors in any traffic systems, the traffic light and
the road length. Traffic lights add more uncertainty to traffic counts and thus result
in higher variance than the derived values. The road lengths make the covariances
smaller, because travelling from points to points usually takes a non-neglectable
amount of time. In the following text, we propose two refinement methods to
solve these problems.
1. Variance Correction
For any edge e ∈ −→E , let −→Ce denote the set of edges satisfying ∀f ∈ −→Ce, f =
−−−−→
(uk, u) ⇔ e =
−−−−→
(u, uj). In other words, the common end point of all edges in
−→
Ce is the starting point of e, or the road segments in
−→
Ce have direct flows to the
road segment e. Assume e has a probability of ω−→
f,e
to accept a vehicle from road
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f at each cycle. The number of vehicles it accepts from f after a given number
of cycles follows a Binomial distribution. Recall that we have defined T as the
number of cycles in each sampling period. Using the Gaussian approximation
for Binomial distribution, the incoming flow from an edge f in
−→
Ce results in an
expected traffic count of
∀y ∈ I(e), E−→
f,y
(y) = T • ω−→
f,e
. (6.7)
For simplicity, assume all ω−→
f,e
carry the same value ωe for edge e, and flows
from all f ∈ −→Ce are independent. The expected total traffic count is the summation
of every individual expected count at Eq. 6.7, which is
∀y ∈ I(e), E(y) =
∑
f∈−→Ce
E−→
f,y
(y) = |−→Ce| • T • ωe. (6.8)
Since we already have a good approximation to the expected values using the
previous model, we estimate ωe as the value of E(y)/(|−→Ce| • t) with confidence.
We further approximate the variances as
∀y ∈ I(e), V ar(y) = |−→Ce| • Tωe(1− ωe) = E(y) • (1− E(y)|−→Ce| • T
). (6.9)
In other words, the variance at a road segment is estimated using the expected
value, the length of a sampling period, and the number of incoming road segments.
2. Covariance Correction
We first consider a simple case of two points x, y on the same edge e, y being
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the down flow point of x. Their distance is defined using term D(−→x, y). Assume
all vehicles travel at a constant speed v and reach y from x in at most two sampling
periods. The traffic count at y during period t is given by the summation of two
parts. One is the number of vehicles leaving x in period t and arriving at y.
Another is the number of vehicles leaving x in period t− 1 but arriving in period
t. The value of traffic count is formally written as
X t =
T −D(−→x, y)/v
T
•X t + D(
−→x, y)/v
T
•X t−1. (6.10)
Let x′ be the random variable representing the previous sampling period of
x. Random variables x, x′ follow the same distribution but are assumed mutually
exclusive. The covariance of y and x is given by
Cov(y, x) = Cov(
T −D(−→x, y)/v
T
• x + D(
−→x, y)/v
T
• x′, x)
=
T −D(−→x, y)/v
T
• Cov(x, x). (6.11)
Since Cov(y, x) = Cov(x, y), we omit the arrow in D(−→x, y) and use the absolute
distance D(x, y).
The generalization of Eq. 6.11 to any two points is given by
Cov(y, x) =
T −D(x, y)/vx,y
T
• Cov′(y, x), (6.12)
where vx,y is the average speed between x and y, D(x, y) is the length of the short-
est path between x and y, and Cov′(y, x) is the covariance computed by Eq. 6.6.
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In a real street system, we recommend to use the speed limits to approximate vx,y.
6.4 Optimal Sensor Placement
Guitton et al. tackle this problem by formulating it as a dominating set problem
[29]. The scope of this method is limited because it does not utilize 1-to-n corre-
lations. Instead, we define a heuristic function and propose three algorithms for
minimization.
It is not possible to obtain the exact value of the objective function, since
computing ∆(Q) (Eq. 6.1) requires the complete sample set not available in the
sensor selection phase. We use the marginal covariance matrix COVU |Q defined
by Eq. 2.4 to approximate ∆(Q). Let function diag(M) denote the diagonal ele-
ments of matrix M . We have
∆(Q) ≈ h(Q) =
√
diag(COVU |Q), (6.13)
that is, ∆(Q) is approximately the average of the square roots of the diagonal ele-
ments in COVU |Q. Function h(Q) is the heuristic function. We use three methods,
greedy, m-random trial, and local search to minimize h(Q). As an example, we
discuss the algorithm using Eq. 6.2.
1. Greedy Algorithm
Start with an empty set Q. In every iteration, choose a point b ∈ V − Q such
that h(Q + {b}) is minimal. Terminate the process when reaching the desired
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number of sensor nodes η.
2. m-Random Trial Algorithm
For each of m trials, randomly generate a placement Q with η sensor nodes.
Select the placement with the lowest h(Q) value.
3. Local Search Algorithm
Start with a valid placement achieved by the previous methods. In each iter-
ation, select a neighborhood of new placements that exchange any pair of points
in Q and Y . Choose the neighbor resulting in the maximal reduction in h(Q) and
use it as the inputting solution for the next iteration. Terminate the process when
no more improvement is possible or reaching a given number of iterations.
6.5 Experimental Result
We conduct the experiments in the GLD simulator [71]. It uses block as the unit
for distance and assumes all vehicles travel at a constant speed of 2 blocks per
cycle. Vehicles are generated at traffic sources. Each traffic source l is associated
with a spawning frequency of pl, which is the probability of generating a vehicle
in each cycle. The distribution of traffic counts at the sources in each sampling
period (T cycles) is approximately Gaussian. We have
∀l ∈ As, Zl ∼ N(Tpl, T pl(1− pl)). (6.14)
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Figure 6.2: A test map with 72 points of interest distributed at each end of a road
segment. The numbers in the map show the point id.
During our simulation, we set T = 50 and vary the spawning frequencies in
[0.1, 0.4] at different sources.
Each source is also associated with a set of destination frequencies, which is
defined as the percentage of vehicles travelling to each destination. We use them
as the value for q−→
l,k
in Eq. 6.3 and Eq. 6.5 for deriving the traffic model. For each
road segment e, we select its two ends as the points of interest I(e). A sample
setup is shown in Fig. 6.2.
We conducted simulations in each map and collect 3000 samples. We ran-
domly choose 70% of the samples as the training set and use the remaining 30%
as the test data set.
We first compare the prediction accuracy of the Gaussian model based method
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Figure 6.3: The average RMS prediction error of the Gaussian based and coeffi-
cient based methods. The average number of vehicles is 15.1 per 50 cycles.
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to the coefficient based method introduced in [29]. The models were acquired
based on machine learning methods. The experiments were conducted in a road
map with 72 points of interest (Fig. 6.2). For each method, we systematically
test different number of deployed sensors, i.e., |Q| = 1...64. We randomly pick
30 measured points for each number and show the average prediction error on
the unmeasured points in Fig. 6.3. In general, the prediction error reduces as
we add more measured points. The error is around 25% when we deploy one
sensor, and reduces to 13% when we deploy 64 sensors. We have two further
observations. 1) When the size of Q is small, some unmeasured points do not
have any strongly correlated observations. Adding measured points usually results
in a dramatic improvement in the accuracy of coefficient based method. When
the size of Q is large, such improvement is getting small since most unmeasured
points already carry strong correlations to some points in Q. 2) The Gaussian
method outperforms the coefficient based method in all test cases, with a linearly
decreasing curve as the size of Q increases. This shows that the average variance
of the posterior distribution reduces at an almost constant step as we add more
points of observation to Q.
Next, we compare the model acquired through the analytical method to the
model trained by the machine learning based method, and study the prediction re-
sults of the analytical model. In the same maps, we compare the analytical model
to the model acquired through maximal likelihood learning. We first examine
them in a simple map with 16 points of interest. The analytical model is a close
approximation to the learned model, and achieves predictions with similar level
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and the machine learning based method.
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of accuracy. We further conduct the comparison in a large map with 84 points of
interest (Fig. 1.3). Figure 6.4∼6.6 compare the resulting means, standard devi-
ations, and covariance matrix of the analytical model and the learned model. In
general, the estimations are close. Most problems occur in the approximations of
covariances with underestimations. They are however not significant threats to the
prediction accuracy, because 1) the number of occurrences is small, 2) the largest
errors are only around half of the variances, and 3) the underestimated points au-
tomatically get lower weights in the prediction formula (Eq. 2.3), reducing the
effects of underestimations. Figure 6.7 shows that using the analytical model and
the Gaussian based method, we achieve prediction accuracy close to the Gaussian
based method with learned models, and higher than the coefficient based method
with learned models when the size of Q is small or large.
In the last set of experiments, we compare the greedy, m-random trial and the
local search methods for sensor placement. m is set to 100 in the m-random trial
method. The results are summarized in figure 6.8. The greedy algorithm out-
performs the 100-random trial method, only leaving small spaces for local search
algorithm to improve. We have also noticed in the experiments that good place-
ments are usually sparsely distributed (e.g., Fig. 6.1). This is because nearby
points usually share high covariances.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Leveraging the spatial/temporal correlation between sensor data in wireless sen-
sor and mobile networks provides new means to protect data integrity, to detect
faulty sensor node, to track a subject, and to reduce sensor operating deployment
cost. Statistical inference plays an important roles in the design of algorithms in
wireless sensor and mobile networks.
We have introduced Cobra as a new energy-efficient means to authenticate sen-
sor data, with energy savings of up to one magnitude lower than existing methods.
It also protects sensor networks from aggressive attacks by limiting the maximal
damage on data reliability. It is suitable for data collection sensor networks op-
erated in centralized manners. Most sensor network applications require only
approximated results and can be well-protected by Cobra. It is important to note
that Cobra is not designed for systems that require zero error. As an inference
based method Cobra inevitably introduces small error even when the attacks are
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not aggressive.
Based on a new proposed measurement mutual divergence, we have proposed
a method for distributed faulty sensor detection. The method is shown to achieve
detection accuracies close to 100% in most test cases. In addition, it does not
assume particular type of fault and can be used as a general measure for a number
of know fault types. It is also recommended for the systems where the type of fault
is unknown. As a fully distributed method, it significantly reduces communication
cost since the message exchange only happened between neighboring nodes and
detected faulty sensor’s readings do not need to be forwarded.
We have proposed SMART, a new system for simultaneously track mobile
subjects and acquire logic maps. SMART is shown to outperforms a competing
tracking method by 9 times and constructs logic maps up to 89% accurate simulta-
neously. SMART is also robust against sensing errors and automatically adapts to
floorplan changes. We believe SMART could extend the scope of location based
services from outdoor to indoor, and reduce the need for tedious manual data col-
lection in map construction.
We also study the statistical inference problems in traffic monitoring sensor
networks, where we derives analytical correlation models instead of relying on
machine learning based models. We show that the models are close estimations
to the learned models and also investigate a number of sensor placement methods.
The model derivation is based on original-destination matrix, which is available
and constantly updated in major U.S. urban areas. Out proposed method could
aid in reducing sensor placement costs and the cost in collecting training data
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necessary for the machine learning based models.
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